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TAX LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2017) 
 
 
The mortgage interest deduction is often criticized for contributing to after-tax 
income inequality. Yet the effects of the mortgage interest deduction on income 
inequality are more nuanced than the conventional wisdom would suggest. We 
show that the mortgage interest deduction causes high-income households (i.e., 
those in the top 10% and top 1%) to bear a larger share of the total tax burden 
than they would if the deduction were repealed. We further show that the effect of 
the mortgage interest deduction on income inequality is highly sensitive to the 
alternative scenario against which the deduction is evaluated. These findings 
demonstrate that claims about the distributional effects of the mortgage interest 
deduction depend critically on the counterfactual to which the status quo is 
compared. We extend our analysis to the deduction for state and local taxes and 
the charitable contribution deduction. We conclude that the appropriate 
counterfactual for distributional claims is dependent upon political context—and, 
in particular, on the feasible set of politically acceptable reforms up for 
consideration. 
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Introduction  
 
The home mortgage interest deduction (MID) is much loved by taxpayers1 and much 
maligned by commentators.2 One frequent critique of the MID in both the academy and 
the mainstream media is that it exacerbates inequality. On the academic side, for 
example, Professor Dennis Ventry has written that the MID is “the most inequitable” tax 
expenditure provision,3 while Professors Stephen Cecchetti and Kermit Schoenholtz say 
that “the tax deductibility of mortgage interest . . . raises inequality.”4 In the mainstream 
media, the Washington Post editorial board has called the MID “a significant cause of 
after-tax income inequality,”5 and U.S. News & World Report has said that the deduction 
“exacerbates economic inequality rather than promoting opportunity.”6 
 
There is more than a kernel of truth to these criticisms of the MID. Higher income 
households are more likely than lower income households to own homes and take out 
mortgages. Moreover, higher income households tend to have larger mortgages and thus 
generally make larger mortgage interest payments. So too, higher income households are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Oppose Eliminating Income Tax Deductions, 
Gallup, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147125/americans-oppose-
eliminating-income-tax-deductions.aspx (reporting that 31% of respondents favor and 
61% oppose eliminating the MID); Alex Ulam, How a Widely Beloved Tax Deduction 
Really Just Benefits the Well-Off and Exacerbates Inequality, The American Prospect, 
Aug. 20, 2014, http://prospect.org/article/how-widely-beloved-tax-deduction-really-just-
benefits-well-and-exacerbates-inequality (“National opinion polls indicate that between 
60 and 90 percent of Americans support the mortgage interest deduction . . . .”). 
2 See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Uselessness of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 
N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/14/the-worst-tax-breaks/the-
uselessness-of-the-mortgage-interest-deduction; Matthew D. O’Brien, Why the Mortgage 
Interest Deduction Is Terrible, The Atlantic (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-the-mortgage-interest-
deduction-is-terrible/259915. 
3 Dennis J. Ventry Jr., The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform, Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2012, at 
181, 182. 
4 Stephen C. Cecchetti & Kermit L. Schoenholtz, Why the Mortgage Interest Tax 
Deduction Should Disappear, But Won’t, Money & Banking (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2015/6/3/why-the-mortgage-interest-
tax-deduction-should-disappear-but-wont; see also Andrew Hanson, Ike Brannon & 
Zackary Hawley, Rethinking Tax Benefits for Homeowners, National Affairs, Spring 
2014, at 40, 41 (criticizing the mortgage interest deduction as “regressive). 
5 The Post’s View: Fixing the Most Expensive Deduction, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fix-a-tax-deduction-that-contributes-to-
income-inequality/2015/11/29/d2b20242-8ed4-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html. 
6 Sara Mead, Good for Wealthy Homeowners, Bad for Education, U.S. News, May 26, 
2016, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-26/the-mortgage-interest-
deduction-is-bad-for-schools-and-education. 
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more likely than lower income households to itemize deductions on their tax returns, and 
higher income households also face higher marginal tax rates. For all these reasons, the 
benefits of the MID in dollar terms (i.e., the amount by which the MID reduces total tax 
liability) tend to be larger for higher income households than for lower income 
households. 
 
Yet focusing on the benefits of the MID in dollar terms for households across the income 
distribution is only one way of assessing the MID’s distributional consequences. A “tax 
expenditure”7 such as the MID may provide larger benefits to higher income households 
in dollar terms, while at the same time increasing the share of the tax burden borne by 
higher income households relative to lower income households. This observation may 
seem surprising upon first glance,8 though we hope it will become less so over the course 
of the pages that follow. We further show that this observation applies to the MID. 
Households in the top 1% of the income distribution receive, on average, much larger 
monetary benefits from the MID compared to households in the bottom 99%; yet at the 
same time, the MID causes the top 1% to bear a larger share of the total tax burden than 
they otherwise would. A similar story emerges when we compare the top 10% to the 
bottom 90%.  
 
Does the divergence across these various distributional measures imply that any 
conclusion about the distributional consequences of the MID is impossible? One author, 
Thomas Griffith, has suggested as much: under the “widely accepted view that inequality 
should be measured by the relative distribution of income,” Griffith writes, “the impact of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 defines “tax 
expenditures” as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which 
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a 
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Pub. L. No. 93-344, 
§ 3(3), 88 Stat. 297, __. 
8 Martin Gervais and Manish Padney have made a similar observation, although only in 
passing. See Martin Gervais & Manish Padney, Who Cares About Mortgage Interest 
Deductibility?, 34 Canadian Public Policy 1, 12 (2008) (“It is interesting to note that even 
for the conventional measure[,] mortgage interest deductibility does not make the tax 
system less progressive at all income levels.”). The work most similar to our own appears 
to be Daniel H. Weinberg, The Distributional Implications of Tax Expenditures and 
Comprehensive Income Taxation, 40 Nat’l Tax J. 237 (1987), which estimates the 
distributional effects of a revenue-neutral elimination of all tax expenditures in the 1979 
and 1983 tax codes. See also Adam J. Cole, Geoffrey Gee & Nicholas Turner, The 
Distributional and Revenue Consequences of Reforming the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 64 Nat’l Tax J. 977 (2011) (estimating distributional effects of revenue-
positive MID reforms, but not considering reallocation under revenue-neutral scenarios); 
Francesco Figari et al., Removing Homeownership Bias in Taxation: The Distributional 
Effects of Including Net Imputed Rent in Taxable Income, Fiscal Studies (forthcoming 
2016) (considering the distributional effects of eliminating the exclusion of imputed rent 
for homeowners in six EU countries). 
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tax expenditures on progressivity is ambiguous.”9 Our view is more optimistic. We 
suggest that the distributional consequences of a tax expenditure can be evaluated in 
comparison to a counterfactual in which the same tax expenditure were repealed. If repeal 
increases the after-tax income of the poor relative to the rich, then repeal is inequality-
decreasing (i.e., the tax expenditure increases inequality relative to a counterfactual in 
which the expenditure did not exist). If repeal reduces the after-tax income of the poor 
relative to the rich, then repeal is inequality-increasing (i.e., the tax expenditure decreases 
inequality relative to a counterfactual in which the expenditure did not exist). 
 
The challenge in evaluating the distributional consequences of a tax expenditure, then, is 
to define an appropriate counterfactual against which to compare the status quo. To 
elaborate: Repeal of the MID will cause federal tax revenue to rise, and the distributional 
effect of repeal will depend on how that additional revenue is allocated. Different 
methods of allocating the additional revenue will lead to different distributional 
consequences: for example, repeal of the MID will raise the after-tax income of the poor 
relative to the rich if the additional revenue is used to finance equal-sized rebates for all 
households, but repeal will raise the after-tax income of the rich relative to the poor if the 
additional revenue is used to reduce all households’ tax liabilities proportionally. If the 
additional revenue is used to finance the provision of additional government services, 
then the distributional consequences of repeal will depend on who benefits from those 
services. Whether a particular counterfactual better captures reality than any other will 
depend upon the political context in which repeal is most likely to occur. We conclude 
that claims regarding the distributional effects of tax expenditures should, as a general 
matter, be accompanied by a specification of the counterfactual that the distributional 
analysis assumes. Counterfactuals can then be evaluated in light of the political context in 
which such distributional claims are made.  
 
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I offers an overview of the MID and the debate it 
has engendered. Part II illustrates through a simple numerical example how a tax 
provision can yield greater benefits in dollar terms for the rich while at the same time 
increasing the share of taxes that the rich pay. Part III examines the distributional effects 
of the MID under several revenue-allocation assumptions, and compares the distribution 
of tax burdens under the status quo to hypothetical scenarios involving the MID’s repeal. 
We show that claims regarding the distributional effects of the MID depend critically on 
(often undefended) assumptions about the manner in which additional revenues from an 
MID repeal would be allocated. Part IV shifts focus from MID repeal to MID 
modification: specifically, we examine a proposal by presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton to impose a 28% cap on the MID and other itemized deductions. Part V discusses 
likely behavioral responses to MID repeal and investigates the effect of those responses 
on our findings. Part VI examines the implications of our approach for other tax 
expenditures.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 Hastings 
L.J. 343, 360 (1989). 
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I. The Mortgage Interest Deduction Debate 
 
We begin with a brief background regarding the mechanics of the MID and the debate 
over the deduction. Our aim here is neither to provide a comprehensive treatment of the 
MID’s details nor to conduct an exhaustive survey of the literature on the MID.10 Rather, 
our goal is to situate our contribution within the larger conversation regarding the MID.  
 
The deductibility of home mortgage interest is a longstanding feature of the federal tax 
code. The Revenue Act of 1913, the first tax law passed after the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, allowed taxpayers to deduct all personal interest—including but 
not limited to home mortgage interest. That changed with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
when Congress disallowed deductions for personal interest. But the 1986 Act carved out 
an exception for home mortgage interest (and, because home mortgage loans are the 
primary form of personal borrowing in the United States, the exception comes quite close 
to swallowing the rule11). The disallowance of a deduction for personal interest generally 
and the exception for home mortgage interest specifically are codified in section 163(h).12 
 
Specifically, section 163(h)(3) allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for “qualified 
residence interest.” Qualified residence interest comes in two forms: interest paid on 
“acquisition indebtedness” and interest paid on “home equity indebtedness.” “Acquisition 
indebtedness” refers to debt incurred in acquiring, constructing, or improving a “qualified 
residence” of the taxpayer, provided that the debt is secured by such residence. The term 
“qualified residence” refers to a taxpayer’s principal residence and one other residence 
that the taxpayer can select (e.g., a vacation home). “Home equity indebtedness” refers to 
debt secured by a qualified residence that was not incurred in acquiring, constructing, or 
improving the home.  
 
The deductibility of mortgage interest is subject to certain constraints. Taxpayers are 
limited to $1 million in acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 in home equity 
indebtedness, and cannot deduct interest paid on debt exceeding those amounts.13 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For an excellent overview, see Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of 
the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 Tax Policy and the Economy 37 (2003). 
11 In the first quarter of 2016, $10.0 trillion in mortgage debt secured by one- to four-
family residences was outstanding in the United States, compared to $3.6 trillion in other 
forms of consumer credit. Compare Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Mortgage 
Debt Outstanding (1.54), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm (last 
updated June 24, 2016), with Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumer 
Credit – G.19, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm (last 
updated July 8, 2016). 
12 On the history of the home mortgage interest deduction, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The 
Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 
73 Law & Contemporary Problems 233 (2010). 
13 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)-(4). Mortgage insurance premiums are treated as home mortgage 
interest for deduction purposes. 
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Moreover, interest is only deductible if taxpayers itemize deductions, which most 
taxpayers do not.14 For itemizers, the MID is available regardless of the amount of other 
deductions that itemizers claim,15 and taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax 
can claim the MID as well.16 
 
Supporters of the MID have proffered several justifications for the deduction. One 
argument proceeds from the premise that homeownership generates positive externalities 
and should therefore be subsidized. As Edward Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro summarize, 
homeowners “own an asset whose value is tied to the strength of their community,” and 
thus “have an incentive to act (and vote) for policies and practices that will make their 
community more attractive.” Moreover, homeowners “face incentives to take better care 
of their homes than do renters,” and “[i]f some of this care creates aesthetic externalities, 
then homeownership may yield benefits through greater care.”17 Indeed, several studies 
find that homeownership generates positive externalities for children. For example, the 
children of homeowners appear to be more likely to graduate from high school than 
children of renters, even after controlling for income, residential stability, and additional 
household characteristics.18 Other studies have linked homeownership to lower crime 
rates,19 increased voter turnout,20 and higher participation in neighborhood activities.21 
 
Critics of the MID attack the deduction from several angles. One common argument 
against the MID is that the deduction distorts households’ decisions regarding home 
purchases, leading them to buy more expensive homes than they otherwise would (i.e., an 
inefficient allocation of resources). A second argument is that homeownership actually 
generates negative externalities. Specifically, a high rate of homeownership in a 
jurisdiction appears to make it more likely that the jurisdiction will adopt exclusionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For the 2013 tax year, 68.5% of individual income tax returns claimed the standard 
deduction. This marks a slight increase from the 2010 tax year, when 65.6% of returns 
claimed the standard deduction. See Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income—2013: 
Individual Income Tax Returns 6, 8 (2015) [hereinafter SOI 2013]. 
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 67(b)(1) (exempting the interest deduction from the 2% floor on 
miscellaneous itemized deductions). 
16 See 26 U.S.C. § 56(e). While interest on acquisition indebtedness is deductible for 
AMT purposes, interest on home equity indebtedness is not. 
17 Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 60-61. 
18 See, e.g., Daniel Aaronson, A Note on the Benefits of Homeownership, 47 Journal of 
Urban Economics 356 (2000); Richard K. Green & Michelle J. White, Measuring the 
Benefits of Homeowning: Effects on Children, 41 Journal of Urban Economics 441 
(1997). 
19 Karla Hoff & Arijit Sen, Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segregation, 
95 Am. Econ. Rev. 1167 (2005). 
20 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting,  
and Yardstick Competition, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 25 (1995). 
21 William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local 
Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies (2001). 
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zoning policies,22 imposing costs on households that want to move to the area. A third 
argument is that even if homeownership ought to be subsidized, the MID is a blunt tool 
for accomplishing that objective, and that other policy instruments—such as a credit that 
does not depend on a household’s marginal tax rate23— would do more to increase 
homeownership.24 A further drawback of the MID is that it undermines the tax system’s 
role as an automatic stabilizer: while the progressive nature the tax code provides 
insurance against macroeconomic swings by helping to stimulate demand in times of 
recession and taper demand during boom times, the MID appears to exacerbate 
macroeconomic swings.25 
 
A final criticism of the MID—and perhaps the most cited concern regarding the 
deduction—is that the MID is an “upside-down subsidy” that primarily benefits the 
rich.26 As noted in the introduction, the dollar benefits of the MID flow primarily to high-
income taxpayers. Well over half of the tax benefits from the MID flow to households in 
the top income decile, with the large majority of households in the bottom half of the 
income distribution not benefiting at all.27 This aspect of the MID gives rise to claims 
such as those quoted in the introduction that the deduction exacerbates income 
inequality.28 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 69-70. 
23 Will Fischer & Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction Is Ripe for Reform 
(Ctr. for Budget & Policy Priorities, Report, June 25, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform. 
24 See Christian A.L. Hilber & Tracy M. Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Its 
Impact on Homeownership Decisions, 96 Review of Economics & Statistics 618 (2014). 
25 See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of 
Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 45 (2012); Kyle 
Rozema & Hautahi Kingi, On the Measurement of Federal Taxes as Automatic 
Stabilizers (unpublished working paper). 
26 William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging 
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, Tax Notes, June 18, 2007, at 1171, 1178. 
27 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2015 004c: 
Share of Benefits of Selected Individual Income Tax Expenditures by Income Class: 
2015 Income Levels and Law (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Selected-Credits-Deductions-and-Exclusions-
2015-Revised.pdf. 
28 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text; see also International Monetary Fund, 
Global Financial Stability Report 2011, at 145 (2011), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/01/pdf/chap3.pdf (criticizing the 
mortgage interest deduction as “expensive and regressive”); Andrea Riquier, The 
Mortgage Interest Deduction May Fuel Inequality, Researchers Suggest, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-mortgage-
interest-tax-deduction-may-fuel-inequality-researchers-suggest-2016-04-13. 
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Our analysis focuses specifically on this last argument—the claim that the MID increases 
income inequality.29 In this article, we set aside efficiency questions and direct our 
attention to the distributional effects of the MID. In particular, we ask what exactly it 
means for a tax expenditure to be inequality-increasing, and whether the MID so 
qualifies. (We then ask the same questions about the deduction for state and local taxes 
and the charitable contribution deduction.) The answers turn out to be quite 
complicated—and quite dependent upon assumptions that often go undefended.  
 
II. Inequality and Ambiguity 
 
Before delving into the data on the MID in practice, we offer a simple (and hypothetical) 
example to show how a provision of the tax code can provide a disproportionate share of 
dollar benefits to the rich while also causing the rich to bear a larger share of total tax 
liabilities.30 Imagine a society with two households—a rich household with pre-tax 
income of $100, and a poor household with pre-tax income of $50. Further imagine that 
the rich household pays $12 in mortgage interest and the poor household pays $9 in 
mortgage interest. Say that the tax system is structured such that the tax rate on the first 
$50 of income is 20% and the tax rate on all income above the $50 threshold is 40%. If 
the tax system does not allow a deduction for mortgage interest, the rich household would 
pay a tax of $30 ($10 on the first $50 and $20 on the next $50), and the poor household 
would pay a tax of $10. Thus the government would collect a total of $40 in revenue; the 
rich household would bear 75% of the total tax burden ($30 divided by $40); and the poor 
household would bear the remaining 25%. 
 
If the tax system allows each household to deduct mortgage interest, the rich household 
would receive a benefit from the deduction of $4.80 ($12 times 40%), and the poor 
household would receive a benefit from the deduction of $1.80 ($9 times 20%). The 
benefit of the MID in dollar terms is clearly greater for the rich household than for the 
poor household. In percentage terms, the rich household received 72.7% of total MID 
benefits, while the poor household received 27.3% of total MID benefits. And yet the rich 
household now bears 75.45% of the total tax burden ($25.20 divided by $33.40), as 
compared to 75.0% before, while the poor household now bears 24.55% of the total tax 
burden ($8.20 divided by $33.40), as compared to 25.0% before. (Government revenue 
decreases from $40 without the MID to $33.40 with the MID.) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 We focus here on income inequality rather than wealth inequality. For a discussion of 
the MID’s effect on wealth inequality, see Kyle Rozema, Who Benefits from Tax 
Expenditures? Incidence Based on Wealth (Mar. 31, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734577.  
30 Using an example involving the deduction for medical expenses, Thomas Griffith 
showed nearly three decades ago that a deduction could generate dollar benefits that flow 
disproportionately to the rich while at the same time “increas[ing] the progressivity of the 
tax system.” See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income 
Tax, 40 Hastings L.J. 343, 357 (1989). Our contribution is to show that Griffith’s 
observation, which was based on a hypothetical he constructed, in fact applies to the real-
world MID and to several other provisions often identified as “tax expenditures.” 
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Table 1: Hypothetical Distribution of MID Benefits and Tax Burden 
 
 
These different ways of analyzing the distributional consequences of the MID thus yield 
divergent conclusions regarding its effects on the rich and the poor. If we focus on 
distribution of MID benefits in dollar or percentage terms, the MID appears to benefit the 
rich more than the poor. If we focus on the way in which the MID affects the distribution 
of the tax burden, we arrive at a different conclusion: the presence of the MID increases 
the share of the total tax burden for the rich household. 
 
One can imagine several other ways to assess a provision’s effect on rich and poor 
households. David Kamin has suggested three other such measures.31 In addition to 
calculating (1) the percentage of dollar benefits that accrue to the rich versus the poor and 
(2) the effect of the provision on the percentage of tax liabilities borne by the rich and the 
poor, Kamin suggests that distributional effects can be assessed by analyzing: 
 
(3) the percent change in taxes paid by the rich and poor as a result of the 
provision; 
 
(4) the percentage-point change in the average tax rate of the rich and the poor as 
a result of the provision; and  
 
(5) the percent change in after-tax income as a result of the provision. 
 
In the above example, the MID reduces the taxes paid by the rich household from $30 to 
$25.20, or 16%, and reduces the taxes paid by the poor household from $10 to $8.20, or 
18%. So in percentage terms, the hypothetical MID reduces the tax bill of the poor 
household more than the rich household. If we focus on the percentage-point change in 
average tax rates, we arrive at a different conclusion: the MID reduces the average tax 
rate of the rich household by 4.8 percentage points (from 30% to 25.2%) but reduces the 
average tax rate of the poor household by only 3.6 percentage points (from 20% to 
16.4%). Likewise, the MID increases the after-tax income of the rich household by 6.9% 
(from $70 to $74.80) while raising the after-tax income of the poor household by only 
4.5% (from $40 to $41.80). So when we focus on the percentage-point change in average 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See David Kamin, Note, What Is a Progressive Tax Change?: Unmasking Hidden 
Values in Distributional Debates, 83 NYU L. Rev. 241, 260-61 (2008). 
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tax rates or the percentage change in after-tax income, the rich household benefits more 
from the MID than the poor household. 
 
Table 2: Distributional Effects of Hypothetical MID (Additional Measures) 
 
 
What, then, is the right way to evaluate the distributional consequences of the MID? We 
make the following (modest) suggestion: If repeal of the MID raises the after-tax income 
of the rich household and reduces the after-tax income of the poor household, then repeal 
of the MID is inequality-increasing. Likewise, if repeal of the MID reduces the after-tax 
income of the rich and increases the after-tax income of the poor, then repeal of the MID 
is inequality-reducing. To be sure, income is not the same thing as happiness (utility); our 
analysis focuses on the former rather than the latter. Some other studies of taxation and 
inequality convert income measures into utility measures;32 we decline to do so here for 
the sake of preserving readability for generalist audiences. 
 
On first glance, it might appear in our hypothetical that repeal of the MID would reduce 
the after-tax income of both the rich household and the poor household, since both 
households’ tax liabilities would rise and thus their after-tax incomes would fall (by 
$4.80 for the rich household and $1.80 for the poor household). Yet repeal of the MID 
would also mean that the government would have $6.60 in additional revenue—revenue 
that it could be reallocated among households. First, imagine that the government spends 
the additional $6.60 to provide a rebate of $3.30 to each household. From this 
perspective, repeal of the MID looks like an inequality-decreasing change. Repeal of the 
MID plus the use of additional revenue to provide each household with a $3.30 rebate has 
increased the after-tax income of the poor household by $1.50 ($3.30 minus $1.80) and 
reduced the after-tax income of the rich household by the same amount ($3.30 minus 
$4.80). Next, imagine that instead of providing each household with a rebate, the 
government spends the $6.60 to produce a public good that the rich and poor household 
each value at $3.30. While the value of the public good would not be reflected in each 
household’s income, the practical consequences are similar to the scenario in which each 
household receives a $3.30 rebate. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See, e.g., J. Richard Aronson, Paul Johnson & Peter J. Lambert, Redistributive Effect 
and Unequal Income Tax Treatment, 104 Econ. J. 262, 266-67 (1994). 
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The government might use the revenue from repeal of the MID in ways other than 
writing an equal-sized refund check to all households or providing additional public 
goods that all households value uniformly. One possibility is that the government would 
use the revenue from repealing the MID to reduce all taxpayers’ liabilities 
proportionately. To elaborate: Repealing the MID would cause the government’s revenue 
to rise from $33.40 to $40 (or put differently, the MID causes revenue to decline by 
16.5%, and repealing the MID would bring that revenue back). The government could 
make repeal of the MID revenue-neutral by calculating each household’s tax liability 
without the MID and then reducing that number by 16.5% so that the government 
continues to collect $33.40. In this iteration, the rich household would pay taxes of $30 
reduced by 16.5%, or $25.05, and the poor household would pay taxes of $10 reduced by 
16.5%, or $8.35. As compared to a world with the MID, this counterfactual leaves the 
rich household with 15 cents more (paying $25.05 instead of $25.20) and the poor 
household with 15 cents less (paying $8.35 instead of $8.20). 
 
Another possibility is that the government might use the additional revenue from 
repealing the MID to reduce all rates in the income tax schedule by a uniform amount, 
such that the entire package of changes—repeal of the MID plus the reduction in rates—
is revenue-neutral. In our hypothetical, the government could maintain revenue neutrality 
by reducing all rates in the schedule by 4.4 percentage points, taxing the first $50 at a 
15.6% rate and income over that at a 35.6% rate. The rich household would now pay 
$25.60 (as compared to $25.20 with the MID), and the poor household would now pay 
$7.80 (as compared to $8.20 with the MID). 
 
In the context of counterfactuals, then, we can make concrete claims about the effect of 
the MID on inequality. Repealing the MID and redistributing the additional revenue to all 
households in equal-sized checks would raise the after-tax income of the poor relative to 
the rich (i.e., repeal would be inequality-decreasing). Repealing the MID and 
redistributing the additional revenue through a pro rata reduction in tax liabilities would 
raise the after-tax income of the rich relative to the poor (i.e., repeal would be inequality-
increasing). Repealing the MID and redistributing the additional revenue through a 
uniform percentage-point reduction in tax rates would be modestly inequality-decreasing, 
with results somewhere in between the per-household refund check scenario and the pro-
rata tax liability reduction scenario.33  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Kamin likewise notes that distributional analysis is straightforward in the context of a 
revenue-neutral change. See Kamin, supra note 31, at 259. The same is true if (a) the 
change is not revenue neutral but leads to more or less government spending, and (b) the 
beneficiaries of the additional government spending can be identified. See id. at 264. He 
argues, though, that “determining the likely distribution of financing often requires much 
difficult and potentially inaccurate guesswork.” Id. at 265. He therefore proposes that we 
adjudicate among various measures of progressivity based on theories of distributive 
justice. See id. at 266-83. 
 We are sympathetic to this effort, and we recommend that serious students of 
taxation and inequality read Kamin’s work. We note, though, that the philosophical 
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We have simplified our distributional analysis by modeling society as having only two 
households: rich and poor. The income distribution in the United States is, of course, 
much more nuanced. Political and academic debates often focus on the distinction 
between households in the top 1% of the income distribution (“the rich”) and the bottom 
99% (“the rest”).34 Thirty years ago, distributional claims were as likely to focus on 
comparisons between top 10% and the bottom 90% as the top 1% versus the bottom 
99%.35 Many readers also will be familiar with the use of the Gini coefficient; we include 
Gini terms as well in our analysis below but will not rely exclusively on Gini coefficients 
(which reduce the complexities of distributional consequences into a single number).36 
 
Our two-household hypothetical also abstracts away from heterogeneity within income 
groups. In the real world, repeal of a tax expenditure may have different effects on 
different households within the same income group. That is, repeal of a tax expenditure 
affects “vertical equity” (the way in which tax liabilities vary in proportion to income) as 
well as “horizontal equity” (the way in which tax liabilities vary for households with the 
same income).37 The MID decreases horizontal equity under virtually any definition of 
horizontal equity. We interpret the claims cited in the Introduction regarding the 
distributional effects of the MID to be making the more ambitious assertion that the MID 
also decreases vertical equity, and the vertical equity implications of the MID are our 
primary focus.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
analysis necessary to identify an appropriate theory of distributive justice is itself quite 
difficult—arguably no less so than the political analysis necessary to determine the likely 
distribution of revenues raised from a tax expenditure’s repeal. See id. at 283 (concluding 
that “different measures [of progressivity] are consistent with different conceptions of 
distributive justice”). Our goal here is to show how one might make positive claims about 
the distributional consequences of a tax expenditure—claims that are not dependent on 
one’s normative priors (though, of course, the implications one draws from this 
distributional analysis will no doubt be normatively driven). 
34 See, e.g., Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel 
Saez, The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective, 27 J. Econ. Persps. 3 
(2013). 
35 See, e.g., Joseph A. Pechman, Letter, “The Bad New Tax Law”: An Exchange, N.Y. 
Rev. of Books, July 16, 1987, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1987/07/16/the-bad-new-
tax-law-an-exchange. 
36 Cf. Andrew Leigh, How Closely Do Top Income Shares Track Other Measures of 
Inequality?, 117 Econ. J. F618, F629 (2007) (noting trend toward use of top income 
shares rather than Gini coefficient to measure inequality, and concluding that “top 
income shares are a useful proxy for inequality across the income distribution”). 
37 For an overview of the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity—and a defense of the 
latter—see Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity, 
19 Fla. Tax. Rev. 79 (2016). 
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III. Who Benefits from the MID—and Who Would Benefit from Its Repeal? 
 
Our discussion of the MID so far has focused on an imaginary two-household society. In 
this part we examine how the MID affects after-tax income inequality. In section III.A we 
describe our data and empirical methods. In section III.B we illustrate the dual character 
of the MID: the dollar benefits flow disproportionately to the rich, but the presence of the 
MID causes the top 10% and top 1% to bear a larger share of federal tax liabilities than 
they would bear in the deduction’s absence. In section III.C we evaluate the effect of the 
MID repeal on the after-tax income of households in different income groups, and we 
show that the effect of the MID on inequality depends critically on how the resulting 
revenue would be reallocated.  
 
A. Data and Empirical Framework 
 
We use data from the 2010 Public Use Tax File produced by the IRS Statistics of Income 
Division (herein referred to as SOI). The SOI contains 159,791 records drawn from 
actual 2010 individual income tax returns, and is designed to be representative of the total 
population of 142.9 million returns filed for that year. The SOI provides a wealth of 
information on sampled returns, including salaries and wages, interest income, dividends, 
and capital gains. The SOI is particularly valuable for our purposes because it includes 
information on itemized deductions claimed on tax returns, including home mortgage 
interest paid. As of this writing, the 2010 file was the most recent available installment of 
the SOI. 
 
To estimate each household’s federal income tax liability with and without the MID, we 
use the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM calculator. TAXSIM allows 
us to estimate the change in a household’s federal income tax liability in the event that 
the MID is repealed while holding other features of the federal tax code constant. Note 
that TAXSIM optimizes aspects of each household’s income tax return so as to minimize 
tax liability, assigning each household to the most advantageous itemization status. 
Imagine, for example, a pair of married taxpayers filing jointly who pay $10,000 in 
deductible home mortgage interest, make $10,000 in deductible charitable contributions, 
and claim no other itemized deductions. Assume that the standard deduction for married 
taxpayers filing jointly is $12,600. TAXSIM projects that the couple will itemize 
deductions if the MID is available (because their $20,000 in itemized deductions exceeds 
the $12,600 standard deduction), but that the couple will claim the standard deduction if 
the MID is repealed (because the $12,600 standard deduction is larger than the $10,000 in 
remaining itemized deductions). 
 
We should note here that our approach—which follows the approach taken by the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis and the Congressional Joint Committee on 
Taxation, as well as virtually every other analysis of the distributional effects of tax 
expenditures—assumes that if the MID were repealed, the standard deduction would 
remain the same. This assumption is contestable. The standard deduction was originally 
justified as a substitute for personal deductions such as the deduction for interest, state 
and local taxes, and charitable contributions. The idea was that these deductions “could 
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be expected to be relatively uniformly distributed across all taxpayers,” and that allowing 
taxpayers to claim a standard deduction rather than tracking and calculating itemized 
deductions would spare them record-keeping and return-preparation costs.38 In more 
recent decades, the justification for the standard deduction on simplification grounds has 
been joined by a “progressivity” justification: the standard deduction effectively expands 
the zero-percent tax bracket already created by the personal exemption.39  
 
Insofar as the standard deduction is justified on simplification grounds—as an 
approximation of the itemized deductions that low- and middle-income taxpayers would 
otherwise be able to claim—then the elimination of the MID might give rise to an 
argument for a smaller standard deduction. After all, the MID accounts for roughly one 
quarter of all itemized deductions.40 Insofar as the standard deduction is justified on 
progressivity grounds as a zero-rate tax bracket, however, elimination of the MID would 
not translate into an argument for reducing the standard deduction (or, at least, not 
straightforwardly).  
 
B. Empirical Analysis 
 
Following a standard approach for assessing the benefits of tax expenditures, we group 
households according to “household size adjusted pre-tax income.”41 To adjust for 
household size, we divide income by the square root of the number of members in the 
household. We then calculate the income percentile for each household. For households 
below the 90th income percentile, we group households by income deciles. For 
households at or above the 90th income percentile, we create the following four groups: 
90th to less-than-95th percentile, 95th to less-than-99th percentile, 99th to less-than-
99.9th percentile, and 99.9th percentile or higher. For each income group, we then sum 
together household tax liability and household MID tax expenditures, and calculate 
average household income. Table 3 shows the distribution of MID benefits in dollar and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict 
Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 Colum. J. Tax Law 203, 211 (2011). 
39 See id. at 212-18. 
40 In 2013, the dollar amount of mortgage interest deductions on individual income tax 
returns was 24.9% of the itemized deduction total. See SOI 2013, supra note 14, at tbl. 
2.1. 
41 See Julie-Ann Cronin, Portia DeFilippes & Emily Y. Lin, Effects of Adjusting 
Distribution Tables for Family Size, 65 Nat’l Tax J. 739 (2012). 
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Table 3: Distribution of MID Benefits Under Current Law 
 
Table 3 is consistent with the standard account of the MID as a tax provision that 
increases inequality. Clearly, the dollar benefits of the MID are concentrated among high 
income households. For the average household in the top income decile, the MID reduces 
federal income tax liabilities by $3,164, while the average household in the bottom 90% 
derives a benefit of just $269 from the MID. The distribution of dollar benefits appears to 
be even more skewed in favor of the rich when we compare the top 1% to the bottom 
99%, with the average household in the top 1% deriving a tax benefit of $7,416 from the 
MID, compared to $498 for households in the bottom 99%.42 All in all, 56.6% of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Note that the top 0.1% are not, in fact, the biggest beneficiaries from the MID in dollar 
terms: households in that stratum actually benefit less on average in dollar terms from the 
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dollar benefits from the MID flow to households in the top 10%, with 13% of benefits 
going to the top 1%. 
 
Table 4 tells a very different story. It shows the distribution of the tax burden in 
percentage terms without the MID (Column 2) and with the MID (Column 3). Several 
features of Table 4 are worth highlighting. The share of all federal individual income 
taxes paid by households in the top decile is lower without the MID than with the MID.43 
That is, the presence of the MID increases the share of the overall tax burden borne by 
the top 10%. Focusing on the very top of the income distribution, the percentage of all 
federal income taxes paid by households in the top 1% is also lower without the MID 
than with the deduction. Again, the MID shifts more of the overall tax burden to 
households at the very top.  
 
Significantly, every income decile from the lowest to the second-highest bears a smaller 
share of federal income tax liabilities with the MID than without. The biggest “winners” 
from the MID on this view are households in the 80th to 90th percentiles; the biggest 
“losers” are households in the top percentile (and, in particular, households in the top 
0.1%). To be sure, many households with incomes that place them in the 80th to 90th 
percentiles do not benefit from the MID (i.e., they do not own their own homes, or have 
paid off all loans, or claim the standard deduction). We note that our analysis sheds light 
on the broad distributional effects of the MID for the specified income groups, and 
ignores the heterogeneous effects within each income group.  Of course, the situations of 
specific households within an income group will differ, with some households benefitting 
from the MID even though the average household within their income group does not, 
and other households losing out from the MID even though the average household within 
their income group benefits from it. 
 
We next evaluate the distributional consequences of the MID according to the additional 
measures proposed by Kamin. Specifically, we show: 
 
— the percentage change in taxes paid by the rich and poor as a result of the 
provision; 
 
— the percentage-point change in the average tax rate of the rich and the poor as a 
result of the provision; and  
 
— the percentage change in after-tax income as a result of the provision. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
MID than households in the 95th-to-99th and 99th-to-99.9th percentile ranges. This 
reflects the fact that the very wealthiest households are less likely to borrow in order to 
buy their homes and more likely to pay cash instead.  
43 We focus specifically on individual income taxes—including dividends and capital 
gains taxes but excluding payroll, estate, and gift taxes. Our analysis also assumes no 
changes affecting the corporate income tax burden. 
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Table 5: Distributional Effects of MID (Additional Measures) 
 
 
Table 5 displays these results. In the second column, we display the percent change in 
taxes paid as a result of the MID for different income groups. The effect of the MID on 
taxes paid is larger in percentage terms for households in the bottom 90% and bottom 
99% than for households in the top 10% and top 1%. On this view, the bottom 90% and 
bottom 99% benefit more from the MID than the top 10% and 1%. On the other hand, 
when we consider the effect of the MID on the average tax rate of households in various 
income group (Column 3), the results are quite different: the average tax rate of 
households in the top 10% and top 1% decreases more in percentage-point terms as a 
result of the MID than the average tax rate for households in the bottom 90% and bottom 
99%. Finally, we consider the change in after-tax income for households in different 
income groups as a result of the MID (Column 4). Here, the results are less 
straightforward: the MID leads to a larger percentage increase in after-tax income for the 
top 10% than for the bottom 90%. And yet the MID leads to a smaller increase in after-




The results above do not yet address this article’s motivating question: how would repeal 
of the MID affect income inequality? Repealing the MID would, of course, raise 
revenues, and the distributional effects of MID repeal will depend on how those 
additional revenues might be allocated. One possibility is that the additional revenues 
would be used to fund an equal-size rebate for each household. In practical terms, this is 
analogous to a scenario in which the government uses the revenues from repeal of the 
MID to finance the provision of additional public goods (e.g., roads, national defense) 
that all households value uniformly. To be sure, the revenue from repealing the MID 
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might be used to finance the provision of additional government services that households 
value disuniformly. Moreover, the value that households derive from public goods and 
government services may be greater than or less than the dollar amount spent. We use the 
equal-size rebate as an analytical starting point (imagining that the rebate comes in the 
form of cash reflected in each household’s after-tax income rather than arriving in-kind). 
 
We estimate that if the additional revenue from repealing the MID were allocated on a 
per-household basis, the per-household benefit would be $558. Note that we are not 
considering any behavioral responses to MID repeal: we are not yet taking into account, 
for instance, the possibility that individuals will respond to MID repeal by rebalancing 
their portfolios and liquidating non-housing financial assets to pay down their mortgages. 
To the extent that those liquidated assets previously generated taxable investment 
income, these portfolio rebalances will decrease future taxable income and thus future tax 
liabilities. (We investigate the impact of likely behavioral responses on the findings in 
Part IV.) Through TAXSIM, however, we are taking into account the possibility that 
some taxpayers will switch from itemizing to claiming the standard deduction if the MID 
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The second column of Table 6 illustrates these effects by income group. Here we report 
the net benefit for households in each income group from repealing the MID and using 
the revenues to provide an equal-sized rebate to each household. Based on the second 
column of Table 6, the MID appears to be inequality-increasing—or, more precisely, 
repealing the MID and using the additional revenue to provide each household with an 
equal-sized rebate appears to be inequality-decreasing. The biggest beneficiaries from 
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such a reform would be households at the bottom of the income distribution. The largest 
losses would be incurred by households at or near the top (in particular, households with 
incomes that place them in the top 1% but not the top 0.1%). 
 
The equal-sized rebate scenario is only one way that revenues from repealing the MID 
might be reallocated. We consider two other plausible alternatives here: reducing each 
household’s federal income tax liability in the same proportion, which we refer to as the 
“proportionate” counterfactual, and cutting tax rates uniformly across the board, which 
we refer to as the “rate reduction” counterfactual. We do not claim that these are the only 
possible ways that revenues might be reallocated; rather, we use these two examples to 
illustrate that distributional claims regarding the MID are highly dependent upon the 
counterfactual against which the MID is assessed.  
 
For the “proportionate” counterfactual, we assume that the new policy would be 
implemented as follows: First, each household’s tax liability would be computed without 
allowing any deduction for home mortgage interest. We estimate total federal individual 
income tax revenue without the MID, and calculate the proportion of such revenue 
attributable to MID elimination (7.7%). We then imagine that each household’s liability, 
calculated without the MID, would be reduced by 7.7% to restore revenue neutrality. For 
households with negative federal income tax liability (e.g., households that receive 
earned income tax credit refunds), we assume no change in liability.44 The third column 
of Table 6 shows the distributional effects of the first of these two revenue-neutral 
reforms. Again, we show the net effect on after-tax income for households in each 
income group if the hypothetical policy is adopted (relative to the status quo). 
 
The “proportionate” counterfactual casts the MID in a light similar to Table 4. From this 
perspective, the MID appears to be inequality-decreasing. The biggest beneficiaries from 
repeal are households in the top 1%. Repeal of the MID accompanied by a proportionate 
reduction in all households’ tax liability would reduce the after-tax income of households 
in most other income groups, with the exception of households in the bottom three 
deciles, whose tax liabilities would be virtually unchanged.45 
 
For the rate reduction counterfactual, we assume that the reform is implemented as 
follows: First, the MID would be repealed, resulting in additional revenues. Next, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The results do not significantly change if we increase the size of the net tax transfer to 
households with negative tax liabilities.  
45 These findings are consistent with the effects anticipated by Dennis Capozza and 
coauthors two decades ago. See Dennis R. Capozza, Richard K. Green & Patric H. 
Hendershot, Taxes, Mortgage Borrowing, and Residential Land Prices, in Economic 
Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 171, 174 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale, eds., 
1996) (“[R]emoving the deduction and using added revenue to cut tax rates 
proportionately would significantly redistribute the U.S. tax burden. . . . The loss of the 
deductions would hurt higher-income households, but they would also gain a lot from the 
tax cut because they pay a disproportionate share of taxes. Lower-income households 
would lose less from repeal of the deduction but would also gain less from the rate cut.”). 
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Congress would reduce every rate in the marginal rate schedule such that total revenues 
fall by just enough to offset the gains from repealing the MID. We estimate that the rate 
reduction that leads to a perfect offset is 1.36 percentage points. That is, the 10% bracket 
would become a 8.64% bracket; the 15% bracket would become a 13.64% bracket, and 
so on. We simulate the reform by adjusting both ordinary income tax rates and capital 
gains rates. The final column of Table 6 shows the distributional effects of the second of 
the two revenue-neutral reforms described above: an across-the-board reduction in rates. 
 
The distributional effects of an across-the-board rate reduction are nuanced. Relative to 
the current tax system, the reform leaves households in the top percentile better off on 
average, and leaves households in the bottom 99% worse off on average. These results 
again underscore the fact that even though the dollar benefits from the MID flow 
disproportionately to the top 1%, the dollar benefits from a revenue-neutral repeal of the 
MID may flow even more disproportionately to the top 1%. When we focus on the top 
decile rather than the top percentile, however, the story that emerges is somewhat 
different: the reform leaves households in the bottom 90% better off, while leaving 
households in the top 10% worse off. The differences between the top decile and top 
percentile are driven by substantial heterogeneity within the top decile. Households in the 
90th-95th and 95th-99th percentiles are left worse off by the contemplated reform, while 
households in the top 1% are left better off. Table 6 thus highlights the fact that 
distributional claims about tax reforms are highly sensitive to measurement choices such 
as the definition of income groups. 
 
To illustrate the results of Table 6 graphically, we show in Figure 1 the change in the 
income group’s share of the total tax burden in the event of a transition from current law 
to the counterfactual. As illustrated in Figure 1, the share of the total tax burden borne by 
lower income households decreases under the per-household allocation scenario and is 
relatively unaffected by the other reforms. The share of the total tax burden borne by the 
top 1% of households decreases when MID repeal results in a proportionate reduction in 
tax liabilities or an across-the-board reduction in rates, and increases with per-household 
reallocation. Households in the 80th to 99th percentile income groups see their share of 
total tax liabilities increase as a result of MID repeal under any of the scenarios.  
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Finally, we examine the distributional effects of the MID by considering the change in 
income inequality that would result from eliminating the deduction. To assess effects on 
the distribution of after-tax incomes, we employ the Gini coefficient, the most common 
measure of inequality. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values 
representing more inequality. Estimates for the Gini coefficient vary depending on the 
specific definition of income (e.g., before or after government transfers), and whether 
wealth is transformed to a flow measure and added to income.46 For present purposes, we 
focus on the Gini coefficient of after-tax income (including any rebate received by 
households as part of the reforms we contemplate). Table 7 presents changes in the Gini 
coefficient induced by various tax reforms.47 We estimate the change in the Gini 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 On the Gini coefficient and alternate income definitions, see generally Robert I. 
Lerman & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Changing Ranks and the Inequality Impacts of Taxes and 
Transfers, 48 Nat’l Tax J. 45 (1995). 
47 For technical reasons, we treat households with incomes less than $1 as having an 
income of $1, which is standard in the literature because the Gini coefficent cannot be 
estimated with incomes less than $1. Other ways to handle negative income in the 
calculation of Gini coefficients are possible. See, e.g., Chau-Nan Chen, Tien-Wang Tsaur 
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coefficient if revenues are reallocated on a per household basis; if revenues are 
reallocated proportionately according to total tax liability; and if revenues are used to 
fund an across-the-board reduction in rates. If revenues are reallocated proportionately 
according to total tax liability, MID repeal leads to greater inequality (an increase in the 
Gini coefficient). Under each of the other scenarios, MID repeal leads to lower inequality 
(a decrease in the Gini coefficient).  
 
   
Table 7: Gini Coefficient of After-Tax Income  
With MID Repeal (Various Counterfactuals) 
 
 
While we report these results as one assessment of income inequality under the different 
counterfactuals, we do so with a note of caution: the benefit of collapsing inequality to a 
single statistic comes at the cost of obscuring the rich information contained within each 
of the income groups. Table 7 nonetheless underscores a theme that we have emphasized 
throughout. To summarize: Whether the MID increases or decreases inequality depends 
on the baseline against which the MID is assessed. And the details of the counterfactual 
will affect not only the magnitude of the MID’s observed effect on inequality, but also 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& Tong-Shieng Rhai, 34 Oxford Econ. Papers 473 (1982). While the treatment of 
negative income may affect inequality analysis under certain circumstances, our 
direction-of-change results are robust to a range of alternative specifications.  
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IV. Capping the MID at 28% 
 
With a majority of voters saying that they support the MID,48 one might expect that the 
deduction is not going away anytime soon. Yet even if elimination of the MID is 
unlikely, modification of the MID is more plausible. Most notably, presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton has proposed capping the deduction at 28%. Under Clinton’s plan, a 
household in the 39.6% bracket would still be able to claim the deduction, but instead of 
the MID reducing the household’s tax liability by 39.6% times the dollar amount of 
deductible mortgage interest for the taxable income subject to the 39.6% marginal rate, 
the MID would reduce the household’s liability by 28% times the dollar amount of 
deductible mortgage interest.49 Senator Bernie Sanders included the same proposal in his 
platform,50 and the Obama administration has included a similar proposal in the 
“Greenbooks” that it has sent to Congress each year since 2010.51  
 
Adam Cole, Geoffrey Gee, and Nicholas Turner of the Treasury Department’s Office of 
Tax Analysis have published estimates of the distributional and revenue consequences of 
a 28% cap on the MID.52 Cole and coauthors do not, however, specify how revenue 
raised by the 28% cap would be reallocated, nor do they discuss how revenue reallocation 
might affect the distributional consequences of the 28% cap. It turns out, however, that 
the distributional consequences of the 28% cap are less sensitive to the choice of 
counterfactual than the distributional consequences of outright MID repeal. Under any of 
the reallocation scenarios discussed in Part III, the 28% cap has an inequality-decreasing 
effect. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See supra note 1. 
49 See Richard Auxier et al., Tax Policy Ctr., An Analysis of Hillary Clinton’s Tax 
Proposals (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-hillary-
clintons-tax-proposals. 
50 Bernie 2016, Making the Wealthy, Wall Street, and Large Corporations Pay their Fair 
Share, https://berniesanders.com/issues/making-the-wealthy-pay-fair-share (last visited 
July 29, 2016). 
51 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2010 Revenue Proposals 87-88 (May 2009); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 132 (Feb. 
2010); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2012 Revenue Proposals 132 (Feb. 2011); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 74 (Feb. 
2012); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2014 Revenue Proposals 135 (Apr. 2013); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals 154-55 (Mar. 
2014); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2016 Revenue Proposals 155 (Feb. 2015); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 154 (Feb. 
2016). On Greenbooks generally, see Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 
102 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
52 See Cole et al., supra note 8. 
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More concretely, capping the MID at 28% would raise an additional $2.718 billion in 
revenue—equal to $19.04 per household. For households in the bottom 90% of the 
income distribution, the 28% cap would be nonbinding, so the only effect of capping the 
MID and reallocating revenues on a per-household basis would be the additional $19.04 
(which could come in kind via the provision a uniformly valued public good, or in cash 
via a refund check). The additional $2.718 billion also could be used to reduce 
households’ tax liabilities pro rata by 0.2857%, or could be used to reduce each rate in 
the marginal rate schedule by 0.049 percentage points. Table 8 illustrates the 
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Table 8: Distributional Effects of 28% Cap on MID (Various Counterfactuals) 
 
 
Perhaps the most striking finding from our analysis of the 28% cap is not that the 
distributional consequences are so progressive, but that the revenue consequences are so 
limited. All in all, the 28% cap would reduce the static cost of the MID by approximately 
3.4% and would raise total federal tax revenue by roughly 0.1%. This is not to suggest 
that the proposal is misguided, but that it is modest: it would indeed result in a reduction 
in after-tax income inequality, but by a barely noticeable amount.   
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V. Behavioral Responses 
 
As noted above, our preceding analysis did not account for potential behavioral responses 
to an MID repeal. It did not take into account, for example, the possibility that some 
households would take out smaller mortgages absent the MID, and that other households 
might switch from buying to renting as a result of repeal. It also did not account for the 
effect of eliminating the MID on market rents or home prices. These behavioral effects 
are no doubt important but are unlikely—as we discuss below—to alter our main 
conclusions.53 
 
Consider again our example from Part II of a household with $50 of income, $9 of 
deductible mortgage interest, and a 20% tax rate. (This is the household labeled “Poor” in 
Table 1 and “Household A” in Table 9.) How would repeal of the MID affect this 
household’s total tax liability? Assuming no behavioral response, the answer is 
straightforward. With the MID, Household A deducts $9 from its $50 of income and pays 
a 20% tax on $41 (i.e., $8.20). Without the MID, Household A pays a 20% tax on all $50 
(i.e., $10). Repeal of the MID raises Household A’s liability by $1.80. 
 
Now imagine another household, Household B, again with $50 of income, $9 of 
mortgage interest, and a 20% tax rate. Unlike Household A, Household B responds to 
repeal of the MID by renting an apartment for $9 a year instead of buying a home. Again, 
the household pays a 20% tax on all $50 of income (i.e., $10). The household’s 
behavioral response does not change the fact that repeal of the MID raised its taxes by 
$1.80. 
 
There are, to be sure, scenarios in which repeal of the MID might cause a household’s 
liability to rise by less than the dollar amount of MID benefits that the household 
previously received. Most significantly for our purposes, it is likely that some households 
would respond to the elimination of the MID by rebalancing their portfolios and 
liquidating non-housing financial assets to pay down their mortgage loans. If those non-
housing financial assets were previously held in taxable accounts, and if the assets 
generated taxable investment income, then these portfolio shifts will decrease taxable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Yair Listokin has made a similar point in the context of revenue estimates. See Yair 
Listokin, Tax Expenditure Estimates Approximate Revenue Estimates, 145 Tax Notes 
701 (2014). Listokin notes that in estimating the additional revenue that would be raised 
from repealing a tax expenditure, a “naïve” approach that assumes no behavioral 
response is “almost as good” as an estimate that accounts for behavioral effects because, 
at least as a general matter, “[m]ost or all of the substitute spending (on other goods 
instead of the good that was formerly tax preferred) would be subject to taxation.” Id. at 
701. Behavioral responses will affect revenue estimates only when spending “move[s] 
from a good that previously benefited from a tax expenditure to a good that continues to 




	   	   	  	   	  
29 	  
income and thus tax liability. An example will serve to illustrate: Imagine a hypothetical 
Household C that has a $100 mortgage balance at a 9% interest rate (thus $9 of mortgage 
interest). Suppose that the household also holds a $100 bond that pays a 10% interest rate 
(so it earns $10 of interest income). Assume that Household C has no other income and 
faces a 20% tax rate. With the MID, Household C has taxable income of $1 ($10 of 
interest income minus $9 of deductible mortgage expense), and thus pays $0.20 in taxes. 
Now imagine that when the MID is repealed, Household C sells the $100 bond and pays 
off its mortgage. It now has no income and pays no tax. In this scenario, repeal of the 
MID actually led Household’s D’s liability to fall. 
 
 
Table 9: Distributional Effects of Hypothetical MID With Behavioral Responses 
 
 
William Gale, Jonathan Gruber, and Seth Stephens-Davidowitz have proposed one way 
to estimate the “dynamic” effects of MID repeal (i.e., the effects after accounting for 
portfolio rebalancing). They assume that taxpayers will respond to MID repeal by 
drawing down financial assets in their taxable accounts to repay their mortgage debt.54 
We apply this method and use it as a robustness check to assess the sensitivity of the 
above findings. Specifically, we assume that households will draw down their financial 
assets first by selling fixed-income assets that generate interest income, and then by 
investments that generate dividends and capital gains. The logic behind this approach is 
that interest income is generally taxed at a higher rate than qualified dividends and long-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Gale et al., supra note 26, at 1171; see also Gervais & Padney, supra note 8; James 
M. Poterba & Todd Sinai, Revenue Costs and Incentive Effects of the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction for Owner-Occupied Housing, 64 Nat’l Tax J. 531 (2011). 
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term capital gains, and so households would sell their most tax-disadvantaged assets 
first.55  
 
We re-estimate the effect of MID repeal on inequality using these portfolio reallocation 
assumptions. Whereas repeal of the MID raised revenue by $79.723 billion in our static 
model in Part III, repeal raises only $68.010 billion in our dynamic model incorporating 
portfolio rebalancing. This is sufficient to provide a $476 refund check for each 
household (as compared to a $558 refund check in our static analysis). If the resulting 
revenues were used to reduce households’ tax liabilities pro rata, the proportionate 
reduction would be 7.15% (as compared to 7.7% in our static analysis). If the resulting 
revenues were used to reduce all rates in the schedule uniformly, the resulting reduction 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Following Cole et al., supra note 8, at 990 we assume that households would sell off 
tax-exempt bonds before selling investments that generate qualified dividends and long-
term capital gains (even though a zero rate of tax is, of course, lower than the preferential 
but still positive rate of tax on qualified dividends and long-term capital gains). 
Motivating this modeling decision is the apparent fact that “individual investors are the 
marginal prices in the municipal bond market at an aggregate level,” and so the yield on 
municipal bonds (the primary type of tax-exempt bonds in the United States) will be such 
that individual investors are indifferent between taxable and tax-exempt fixed-income 
assets. See Andrew Ang, Vineer Bhansali & Yuhang Xing, Taxes on Tax-Exempt Bonds, 
55 J. Fin. 565, 566 (2010). If yields on tax-exempt bonds match after-tax yields on 
taxable fixed-income assets, then we would expect households to liquidate tax-exempt 
fixed-income assets at the same time as taxable fixed-income assets rather than after 
liquidating assets that yield preferentially taxed dividends and capital gains. 
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Table 10: Accounting for Behavioral Responses—Distributional  




Table 10 displays the distributional consequences of repealing the MID under each of the 
three counterfactuals, this time incorporating portfolio reallocation. While the resulting 
estimates of the distributional consequences of MID repeal are smaller in magnitude, the 
signs do not change. In the scenario in which the MID is repealed and each household 
receives a refund check of equal size, repeal of the MID reduces average after-tax income 
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for the top 10% and top 1%, and increases average after-tax income for the bottom 90% 
and bottom 99%. In the scenario in which the MID is repealed and each household’s tax 
liability is reduced proportionately, repeal increases the average after-tax income for the 
top 10% and top 1% (and reduces average after-tax income for the bottom 90% and the 
bottom 99%). Once again, the distributional consequences of repeal plus a uniform rate 
reduction depend on whether we focus on the top percentile or the top decile. Households 
in the top percentile are better off on average in after-tax income terms (and households 
in the bottom 99% are worse off on average) if the MID is repealed and revenues are 
used to reduce all rates in the schedule uniformly. However, households in the top decile 
are worse off on average (and households in the bottom 90% are better off on average) 
under the uniform rate reduction scenario. Again, the driving factor is that the gains from 
this reform are concentrated in the top 1%, and the losses are heaviest for households in 
the 90th to 99th percentiles.  
 
As Gale, Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz note, the assumptions embedded in this 
portfolio reallocation model “imply that taxpayers do a tremendous amount of tax 
avoidance in response to MID repeal.”56 In all likelihood, the resulting estimate is an 
outer bound estimate, and the behavioral response to MID repeal would be less dramatic 
than this. Yet even at the outer bound, the results here suggest that portfolio rebalancing 
is unlikely to alter the conclusions drawn from the results from the static framework. The 




VI.  SALT, the CCD, and Beyond 
 
Up to this point, our focus has been limited to the MID. Yet much of our analysis applies 
beyond the MID domain. Here, we extend our analysis to the two other itemized 
deductions that lead to the largest revenue losses: the deduction for state and local taxes 
(SALT) and the charitable contribution deduction (CCD).57 
 
A.  The Deduction for State and Local Taxes 
 
Like the MID, the SALT deduction traces its origins back to the Revenue Act of 1913. 
From then until 1986, state and local income, sales, and property taxes were generally 
deductible for federal income tax purposes. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed 
deductibility for sales taxes, while leaving the deduction for state and local income and 
property taxes in place. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 gave taxpayers the 
option to deduct state and local income taxes or state and local sales taxes (but not both). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Gale et al., supra note 26, at 1178. 
57 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures 33 tbl. 3 
(Nov. 11, 2015). The exclusion of employer contributions for health care and health 
insurance premiums is a larger expenditure in dollar terms, but is not implemented as an 
itemized deduction.  
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That provision was initially temporary, but was made permanent by Congress at the end 
of 2015.58 
 
The SALT deduction, like the MID, is only available to itemizers. Like the MID, it is not 
subject to the 2% floor on certain miscellaneous itemized deductions. Unlike the MID, 
however, the SALT deduction is limited by the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The 
primary effect of the AMT is to take away the SALT deduction for (some) high-earning 
households.59 
 
The SALT deduction is sometimes criticized in the mainstream media on distributional 
grounds. The National Review, for example, has called the SALT deduction “a regressive 
subsidy.”60 The former chief economist to Vice President Biden, Jared Bernstein, recently 
wrote in the Washington Post that SALT (along with the MID and the CCD) is 
“regressive.” 61 Scholarship on the SALT deduction generally acknowledges that the 
provision’s effects on inequality are more nuanced. Gilbert Metcalf, for example, 
observes that the deduction “is quite regressive at the federal level,” but also “appears to 
lead to a greater reliance on progressive income taxes at the state and local level.”62   
 
Yet even at the federal level, the effect of the SALT deduction on income inequality is 
not so clear cut. Much of what we say above regarding the MID applies as well to the 
SALT deduction: as Table 11 shows, the dollar benefits of the SALT deduction flow 
disproportionately to households in the top 10% and top 1%, while at the same time the 
share of federal tax liabilities borne by the top 10% and top 1% is larger with the SALT 
deduction than without. For this reason, the distributional effects of repealing the SALT 
deduction will depend critically on how the additional revenues would be reallocated.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures 33 tbl. 3 
(Nov. 11, 2015). The exclusion of employer contributions for health care and health 
insurance premiums is a larger expenditure in dollar terms, but is not implemented as an 
itemized deduction. 
59 On the relationship between SALT and the AMT, see generally Brian Galle, Federal 
Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” 
Deduction, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 805 (2008). 
60 The Blue Tax, Nat’l Rev., Dec. 14, 2012, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/335632/blue-tax-editors. 
61 Jared Bernstein, Tilts in the Tax Code: Pictures of Regressive Deductions, Wash. Post, 
July 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/30/tilts-in-
the-tax-code-pictures-of-regressive-deductions. 
62 Gilbert E. Metcalf, Assessing the Federal Deduction for State and Local Tax Payments, 
64 Nat’l Tax J. 565, 588 (2011). 
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Table 11: Distribution of SALT Deduction Benefits; Distribution of Individual 
Income Tax Burden Without and With the SALT Deduction 
 
 
To further illustrate the anticipated effects on inequality of repealing the SALT 
deduction, we repeat the analyses in Part III, replacing the MID with the SALT deduction 
and reporting the results in Table 12. Repealing the SALT deduction would cause federal 
revenue to increase by $76.497 billion—or $536 per household. Using that revenue to 
provide a refund check of equal size to each household would make the average 
household in the top two income deciles worse off in after-tax income terms, and would 
make the average household in the bottom eight income deciles better off. Alternatively, 
the additional revenue could be used to reduce each household’s tax liability 
proportionately—or, more precisely, each household’s tax liability could be calculated 
without the SALT deduction and then reduced by by 6.8%, with the result being revenue-
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neutral relative to the status quo. That reform would make the average household in the 
top 10% and top 1% better off in after-tax income terms, and would make the average 
household in the bottom 90% and bottom 99% worse off. Finally, the additional revenue 
from repealing the SALT deduction could be used to reduce each rate in the schedule by 
1.30 percentage points. This reform would make the average household in the top two 
income deciles worse off, and would make the average household in the bottom eight 
income deciles better off. 
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Table 12: Distributional Effects of SALT  
Deduction Repeal (Various Counterfactuals) 
 
 
Again, we do not claim that any one of these counterfactuals makes more sense 
analytically than any other. Moreover, any comprehensive analysis of the distributional 
effects of the SALT deduction should account for the dynamic effects of the SALT 
deduction on the structure of state and local tax systems. Our insight is that even in a 
static sense, the effect of the SALT deduction on after-tax income inequality depends 
critically on the counterfactual against which the deduction is compared. 
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B.  The Charitable Contribution Deduction 
 
The charitable contribution deduction is almost as longstanding as the MID and the 
SALT deduction, dating back to 1917.63 Like the MID and the SALT deduction, the 
charitable contribution deduction is sometimes criticized on distributional grounds;64 
unlike the MID and the SALT deduction, repeal of the charitable contribution deduction 
would be inequality-decreasing under any of the counterfactuals we consider. As Table 
13 illustrates, the dollar benefits of the charitable contribution deduction flow 
disproportionately to the top 1%, who capture more than 40% of the benefits in dollar 
terms (compared to approximately 31% in the case of the SALT deduction and 13% in 
the case of the MID). The dollar benefits of the charitable contribution deduction are 
sufficiently skewed toward top earners that the share of the tax burden borne by the top 
1% is larger without the charitable contribution deduction than with. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See Roger Colinvaux, Brian Galle & Eugene Steuerle, Urban Inst., Tax Policy and 
Charities: Evaluating the Charitable Deduction and Proposed Reforms 1 (June 2012). 
64 See, e.g., Tax Found., Study Finds Charitable Tax Deduction Regressive, Unfairly 
Subsidizes Many Non-Charities (Nov. 23, 2005), http://taxfoundation.org/article/study-
finds-charitable-tax-deduction-regressive-unfairly-subsidizes-many-non-charities. 
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Table 13: Distribution of CCD Benefits; Distribution of 
Individual Income Tax Burden Without and With CCD 
 
 
As with the MID and the SALT deduction, we simulate the distributional effects of 
repealing the charitable contribution deduction (reporting the results in Table 14). 
Repealing the charitable contribution deduction would raise approximately $39.947 
billion in revenue—which could be redistributed to each household through a $280 
check, or applied to reducing each household’s tax liability by 3.8%, or used to reduce 
each rate in the schedule by 0.705 percentage-points. Regardless of which hypothetical 
we choose, the bottom line result is the same: repeal of the charitable contribution 
deduction would reduce the after-tax income of the average household in the top decile 
and percentile, and would raise the after-tax income of the average household in the 
bottom 90%.  
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Table 14: Distributional Effects of CCD Repeal (Various Counterfactuals) 
 
 
We emphasize that our conclusions regarding the effect of the charitable contribution 
deduction on inequality do not take into account the possibility that the deduction 
encourages more charitable giving, and that such giving itself has a redistributive effect.65 
We simply note that as compared to the MID and SALT deduction, the charitable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Ending Charity Tax Break Will Hurt Poor Most, 
BloombergView (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2011-11-
23/ending-charity-tax-break-would-hurt-poor-commentary-by-stephen-l-carter. 
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contribution deduction is much more skewed to the very rich in terms of the direct dollar 
benefits that it provides, so much so that repeal of the charitable contribution deduction 
has an inequality-decreasing effect under any of the counterfactuals we consider. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that the charitable contribution deduction is so much more 
skewed to the very rich in terms of the dollar benefits that it provides, the charitable 
contribution deduction would be spared by presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s 
proposal to cap itemized deductions at a 28% rate (a proposal that in its current form 





Our analysis simultaneously confirms and challenges widespread beliefs regarding the 
effect of tax expenditures on inequality. The mortgage interest deduction does indeed 
appear to be inequality-increasing relative to a counterfactual in which the deduction is 
repealed and revenues are reallocated to all households on a equal basis; when the 
mortgage interest deduction is evaluated against other counterfactuals, however, the 
distributional effects are more nuanced. A similar story emerges with respect to the 
deduction for state and local taxes: distributional claims regarding the provision are 
contingent upon the counterfactual that such claims presume. Distributional claims about 
the charitable contribution deduction are less sensitive to the choice of counterfactual 
(though, of course, repeal of the charitable contribution deduction could conceivably 
have an inequality-increasing effect in an extreme case—e.g., if the additional revenues 
were used to reduce rates for taxpayers in the top bracket and no one else). 
 
We have chosen to evaluate these tax expenditures against a number of plausible 
counterfactuals, but the possibilities that we consider are by no means exhaustive. For 
example, one might imagine that the revenues raised via repeal would be used to close 
the deficit. The distributional effects of repeal in that case would be intergenerational as 
well as among income groups.  
 
Does this mean that distributional claims regarding tax expenditures are inherently 
indeterminate?67 Our conclusion is not so pessimistic. Distributional claims are 
meaningful when the measure of distributional effects is defined and the counterfactual is 
clearly specified. We do not believe that any one baseline is clearly “better” than any 
other: the relevant counterfactual will depend upon the political environment in which the 
distributional debate occurs. 
 
Context is key. At the extreme, almost any tax expenditure increases inequality relative to 
a counterfactual in which the additional revenues are reallocated to households below the 
poverty line. Likewise, almost any tax expenditure decreases inequality relative to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Mark Hrywna, Clinton Tax Plan Supports Charitable Deduction, The NonProfit Times 
(Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/clinton-tax-plan-
supports-charitable-deduction. 
67 See Griffith, supra note 30, at 359-60. 
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counterfactual in which the additional revenue is reallocated to Bill Gates. Our modest 
suggestion is that participants in debates about the distributional effects of tax 
expenditures should be specific about the counterfactual against which they are assessing 
the status quo. Statements such as “the MID raises inequality” would then carry a 
meaning that is comprehensible. Our hope is that careful attention to the counterfactual 
assumptions underlying distributional claims will make debates about taxation and 
inequality more meaningful. 
 
 
